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Counterfeit Goods Fraud:  
An Account of its Financial Management 
 




Counterfeit goods fraud is stated to be one of the fastest growing businesses in the world.  Academic work 
examining the flows of counterfeit goods is beginning to build momentum.  However, work analysing the financial 
mechanisms that enable the trade has been less forthcoming. This is despite the fact that over the last two decades 
official and media discourses have paid increasing attention to ‘organised crime’ finances in general. Based on an 
exploratory study that brought together academic researchers and law enforcement practitioners from the UK’s 
National Trading Standards, the aim of the current article is to offer an account of the financial management in 
the counterfeit goods trade. Focusing on tangible goods, the article addresses the ways in which capital is secured 
to allow counterfeiting businesses to be initiated and sustained, how entrepreneurs and customers settle payments, 
and how profits from the business are spent and invested. The study covers the UK in the broader context of what 
is a distinctly transnational trade.  
 
 






The trade in counterfeit goods is stated to be one of the fastest growing businesses in the world. 
According to the World Economic Forum (2015: 3) “counterfeiting and piracy […] cost the 
global economy an estimated $1.77 trillion in 2015, which is nearly 10% of the global trade in 
merchandise”. Similarly, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (2011:1) suggests that 
the counterfeiting of goods is a form of fraud that “creates enormous drain on the global 
economy, crowding out billions in legitimate economic activity and facilitating an 
“underground economy” that deprives government of revenues for vital public services, forces 
higher burdens on tax payers, dislocates hundreds of thousands of legitimate jobs and exposes 
consumers to dangerous and ineffective products”.  
 A Home Office study (Mills et al., 2013), estimated the scale of counterfeiting in the 
UK at £90 million per annum, an estimate which has been calculated on the basis of seizure 
data. The social and economic costs of counterfeiting (estimates of lost revenue to legitimate 
business, lost revenue to the exchequer, lost jobs, and enforcement costs, including Criminal 
Justice System costs) were estimated at £400 million per annum (Mills et al., 2013). Indeed, it 
is considerably difficult to accurately measure the size and impact of the global trade in 
counterfeit goods. The trends that can be discerned must be contextualised as associated with 
a number of variables, such as the level of intensity of law enforcement or resolution of various 
governments.  
 Counterfeiting takes place in a number of dimensions, which include deceptive and 
non-deceptive counterfeits (see Camerini et al., 2015), and high and low-quality fakes. The 
level of imitation and intellectual property (IP) infringement can vary from the use of 
fraudulent names and logos that resemble a brand to the unauthorised sale of a legitimately 
produced designer product. The scope of product counterfeiting spans the globe and covers 
virtually every type of product. Statistics on seizures suggest burgeoning markets in ‘non-safety 
critical’ goods such as counterfeit fashion items (Wall and Large, 2010; Large 2015), watches, 
 




and jewellery, and CDs/DVDs (Antonopoulos et al., 2011) as well as in products that can pose 
a significant risk to consumers’ health and safety such as food, alcohol (see Lord et al., 2017; 
Shen and Antonopoulos, 2016; Shen, 2018), tobacco (Shen et al., 2010), cosmetics, medicines 
and medical devices (Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016), pesticides, products in the 
defence/military supply chain (Sullivan and Wilson, 2016), electrical equipment and 
appliances, and car and aeroplane parts (Yar, 2005). Recent cases highlighting the size and 
dynamics of the trade in harmful, ‘safety-critical’, counterfeit goods include hundreds of 
counterfeit aircraft microchips identified in the US defense supply chain, 45 percent of road 
fatalities in Oman attributed to counterfeit spare parts in 2012 alone (Interpol, 2014; 
Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2018), and estimates claiming that the trade in counterfeit, 
falsified and substandard medicines has overtaken marijuana and prostitution to become the 
largest illicit market in the world (IRACM, 2013; Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016). 
Academic work examining the flows of counterfeit goods is beginning to build 
momentum. However, work analysing the financial mechanisms that enable the trade has been 
less forthcoming. This is despite the fact that over the last two decades official and media 
discourses have paid increasing attention to ‘organised crime’ finances in general. In the main, 
these accounts portray crime-money as a corruptive force, a threat to social life and the stability 
of national and global financial systems (for a critique see van Duyne & Levi, 2005; Reuter, 
2013). In the UK alone, the Home Office (2007) estimates the annual revenue derived from 
organised crime at more than £11 billion, while the attendant economic and social costs are 
close to £25 billion. However, despite the fact that asset recovery has become a priority for 
policy-makers and law enforcement agencies internationally (Levi and Osofsky, 1995; Brown 
et al., 2012; FATF, 2012), research on the financial management in illegal markets and other 
manifestations of ‘organised crime’ is limited, with the drug market in specific contexts being 
perhaps the exception (see Reuter et al., 1990; Naylor, 2004; Brå, 2007). There is a relatively 
sound understanding of finance-related issues in the drug markets, with an emphasis on prices, 
costs of doing business (Caulkins et al., 1999; Moeller, 2012), investments and money 
laundering. However, not much is known about other illegal markets (cf. Reuter, 1985; 
Moneyval, 2005; Korsell et al., 2011; Petrunov, 2011; Soudijn and Zhang, 2013) apart from 
useful estimations of their proceeds (see Savona and Calderoni, 2014). Two exceptions are the 
FINOCA 1 and FINOCA 2 projects (CSD, 2015; CSD 2018), which focused on the financial 
management of the illegal tobacco trade, cocaine market, VAT fraud, and human trafficking 
across European member states.  
Moreover, although considerable financial analysis of organised crime has been 
conducted on the disposal of the proceeds of crime and the financing of terrorism (e.g. Levi, 
2010a; Silke, 2000), little has been done in terms of analysing or targeting individuals, 
structures and processes that are involved in the 'preceeds' of crime (Levi, 2010b; see also 
Kruisbergen et al., 2012). Indeed, as the Head of Europol’s Financial Intelligence unit noted in 
an event held at the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice in 2015, “very little is known about 
the financial management of organised crime…” (Navarrete, 2015). This is surprising given 
the fact that financing “is a horizontal issue for all criminal markets” (Hicks, 2015: 1). 
This article builds on the findings from a UK-based project investigating financial 
management in the counterfeit goods trade. Focusing on tangible goods, it addresses the ways 
in which capital is secured to allow counterfeiting businesses to be initiated and sustained, how 
entrepreneurs and customers settle payments, and how profits from the business are spent and 
invested. The study covers the UK in the broader context of what is a distinctly transnational 
trade. To map the main physical and financial flows in counterfeit markets, the article focuses 
on trade with China. Not only is China a dominant manufacturing force in the global economy 
with an advanced export infrastructure, it is also the major global source of counterfeits 




Evidence suggests an identification between the countries that tend to be reported as receptive 
markets for counterfeit products and China’s top legal trading partners, which includes the UK 
(see Shen et al, 2012; OECD/EUIPO, 2017).  
Following this introduction, the article outlines an overview of the methods used and 
data collected. It then offers an account of the nature of the counterfeiting business, and an 
examination of the financial aspects of the trade in counterfeit goods. Its final section provides 
discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
 
METHODS AND DATA 
The research took place in two phases, which allowed the project to develop iteratively. The 
first phase was desk-based and focused on providing the research team with a better 
understanding of the complex business models associated with the trade in counterfeit products. 
Alongside the relatively small body of published academic literature, the review included 
research reports by academics, research institutes, governments, national and international law 
enforcement agencies as well as reports by professional associations and private companies 
that have been either affected by specific types of counterfeiting (e.g. British American 
Tobacco) or commissioned by a client to conduct research on a specific market (e.g. KPMG). 
Open sources also included media sources; of particular relevance here were press releases 
from law enforcement agencies.  
 Counterfeiting-related information and statistics in the Chinese literature were obtained 
from the CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure) – the largest academic database in 
Chinese language. This allowed an initial examination of UK-China interconnections in the 
counterfeit trade. In addition to CNKI, google and baidu (the most popular Chinese search 
engine) were searched by using keywords in Chinese for ‘counterfeit goods’ (jia-mao-chan-
pin), ‘counterfeit and inferior (goods)’ (jia-mao-wei-lie), ‘combatting product counterfeiting’ 
(da-ji-jia-mao) and their variations to capture all relevant cases, examples and statistics 
scattered in open sources. A systematic search of UK and Chinese media databases for stories 
relating to counterfeiting between 1987 and 2017 provided useful contextual information. 
The second phase of the study involved in-depth interviews carried out in the UK with 
law enforcement and other government officials, academics and researchers, criminal 
entrepreneurs, legitimate entrepreneurs and other knowledgeable actors. For this phase of the 
study, participants were identified in four ways. First, during the course of the literature review 
and media research, specific officials from law enforcement agencies who appeared in reports 
or media accounts were approached. Second, potential participants – both officials and criminal 
entrepreneurs – had already been identified from previous research studies that members of the 
team have conducted on various manifestations of ‘organised crime’ including counterfeiting. 
In essence, snowball sampling was used as many of our initial participants introduced us to 
other potential participants. One of the advantages of this method of sampling is the relatively 
informal way of identifying participants from hard-to-reach populations such as illegal 
entrepreneurs (Atkinson and Flint, 2004). Third, participants – primarily from the law 
enforcement side – were suggested by research partners at the National Trading Standards 
eCrime Team, who effectively operated as our ‘gatekeepers’. Fourth, researchers identified 
interviewees with expert knowledge during relevant conferences and events on counterfeiting 
and illicit financing in the UK and Europe.   
A total of 31 interviews with knowledgeable actors were conducted. During this phase 
of the study, the research team’s main objective was to develop a sample that could provide 
informed and detailed accounts of the financial aspects of counterfeiting. In line with the nature 
of qualitative interviewing, which values flexibility, slightly different topic guides for the two 




structure ensured relevant topics were covered, whilst allowing researchers to adapt 
questioning accordingly for individual participants. Core interview themes included: general 
business characteristics, starting up, payments, profits, sourcing and financial factors and 
decisions. Experts interviewed were also asked about their institutional and professional 
background, and types of cases related to counterfeit products trading that their institutions 
handle. To provide richer context, this phase of the research also involved qualitative 
observations across a number of research sites. The research team visited and conducted 
observations at counterfeit product markets in Manchester’s Cheetham Hill (Strangeways) area 
and busy tourist destinations in Spain and across Vietnam and China. Some of these locations 
are well-known for their counterfeit markets, such as Barcelona and the Chinese city of Yiwu, 
a city referred to as the ‘counterfeit capital of China’ (Fleming, 2014).  
Transcripts and fieldnotes derived from the interviews and observations, as well as 
information obtained from the open sources, were analysed using thematic analysis (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). This approach involved open coding, clustering and theme formation. After 
familiarising ourselves with the available data, an initial coding framework was developed. 
Findings were compared and the initial coding framework was refined to its final version 
through discussion and consensus. The final coding framework comprising the main themes 
was approved by all members of the research team. Naturally, themes were induced from the 
information the participants disclosed. The ‘interview-data-as-a-resource’ tradition was used 
to reflect the interviewees’ reality about the topic (Seale, 1998). The final framework was 
applied to all data, and the contents of each transcript as well as the notes taken in the field 
were coded under the appropriate themes. Data were inserted into an Excel spreadsheet 
providing a visual summary of the dataset that allowed authors to identify patterns. Finally, 
powerful and vivid extract examples from the data were selected to highlight accounts put 
forward. In this article, we use pseudonyms for specific participants (e.g. entrepreneurs ‘Dave’ 
and ‘John’).  
The methodological approach outlined above sought to gather rich data to examine a 
previously under-researched aspect of the phenomenon of counterfeiting (Yin, 2009). The 
interviews, in particular, provided an important insight, which would not be possible to glean 
from quantitative methods. Therefore, the focus was to seek a purposeful sample, which 
recognised the views and opinions of different relevant actors and their subjective accounts to 
provide authentic ‘voices’ on the issue. However, the researchers are especially mindful that 
official data including data derived from interviews with members of the authorities is the result 
of law enforcement activity, which in turn depends upon resource restrictions, the competency 
of agents, organisational priorities, and wider political priorities (Levi, 2004). Similarly, as 
reflected upon by almost all researchers who have conducted interviews with ‘organised 
criminals’, such interviews have potential for limitations. In addition to attempts to ‘cross-
check’ and ‘member-check’, in common with other qualitative research on topics related to 
‘organised crime’, developing ‘trust’ with criminal entrepreneurs was essential for seeking 
truthful and credible accounts (Ellis and MacGaffey, 1996; Titeca, 2019). This was in part 
enabled by the research team’s existing contacts, relationships and networks in the field; 
however, at the same time, this risks limiting the sample to the researchers’ own personal 
network and, as a consequence, possibly the scope of the findings (Hobbs & Antonopoulos, 
2014).  
Moreover, although media sources are used as sources of technical information about 
manifestations of ‘organised crime’, they should be treated very cautiously for a variety of 
reasons (see Shen & Antonopoulos 2016). Not only do they most often refer to those cases 
which the authorities came across, thus ignoring cases of successful (non-apprehended) 
‘organised criminals’ and/or uninterrupted schemes, but they also tend to present the issues 




morally charged manner; something that has limited analytical value. Sources retrieved from 
search engines depend on the researcher providing keywords, a process that may lead to the 
exclusion of reports that are peripherally relevant but may be extremely important for the wider 
context of the study. Nevertheless, we think that the methodological triangulation throughout 
the phases of the study and the consultation of both official and ‘unofficial’ sources of 
information ensured methodological rigor and coherence (Tracy, 2010) and has created a net 
that has captured the most important aspects of the financial aspects of counterfeiting providing 
a unique insight into this issue and generating future directions in research. 
 
 
THE NATURE OF THE COUNTERFEITING BUSINESS 
Generally, the core of the counterfeit product supply chain comprises of counterfeit 
manufacturing, transportation, storage, and distribution/retailing. According to figures by the 
World Customs Organization, the US Government and the European Commission, most of the 
world’s counterfeit products originate from China (OECD/EUIPO, 2017). In 2009, China was 
the source of US$205 million worth of counterfeit goods seized in the United States, which 
was 79% of the value of all counterfeit products seized that year (UNODC, 2010). In 2014, 
81% of all Intellectual Property (IP)-related seizures in the EU came from China and another 
8% via Hong Kong, whereas in 2016 China was identified as the country of provenance making 
up almost 73% of suspected goods infringing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) detained at EU 
borders in terms of value and 66% in terms of volume (OECD/EUIPO, 2017). The movement of 
counterfeit products from China to the rest of the world is facilitated by the ownership of key 
shipping ports around the world. In Antwerp, for instance, one of the largest and busiest ports in 
the world, 3 out of 4 container docks are operated by Chinese corporations (EUROPOL/Office 
for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, 2016). Other important counterfeits producers include 
Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Ghana, Morocco, Vietnam, Panama, India, 
and Russia.  
According to official and commercial association sources (see European Union, 2017; 
Retail Times, 2018), the United States and the European Union are major destinations for 
counterfeit products. In 2017 alone, the retail value of only the ‘top counterfeit items’ seized 
at EU border reached approximately € 0.5 billion (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Top counterfeit items seized at EU borders in 2017, by retail value 
 
Product type Number of 
articles seized 
Retail value 
of goods (€) 
Watches 207,604 171,485,023 
Clothing 2,331,558 65,547,529 
Jewellery and other accessories 140,267 57,508,010 
Bags, including wallets, and purses 417,712 52,344,132 
Shoes (including sports shoes) 901,820 71,034,412 




Perfumes and cosmetics 377,800 20,607,757 
Parts & technical accessories for 
mobile phones 
770,349 16,276,538 
Mobile phones 62,939 13,219,817 
Total 8,650,157 489,794,807 
 
Sources: European Union (2017); Kroll analysis cited in Retail Times (2018) 
 
A notable trend that has been observed in recent years is that the manufacturing of fakes has 
moved to the global North, including the EU. For example, Italy and Greece have been 
associated with the counterfeiting of fashion items, Lithuania with counterfeiting of alcohol, 
and the UK with the counterfeiting of tobacco products. Currently, there are a number of illegal 
factories that have been dismantled by the authorities in various UK cities and towns including 
Grimsby, Glasgow, and Aberdeen (see Transcrime, 2013; Antonopoulos and Hall, 2015). 
According to one of our participants, the establishment of counterfeit tobacco factories within 
the UK has been a response to the low quality of the products manufactured in typical 
counterfeits-producing countries: 
 
“Cause they were bringing crap in. Getting bales of crap tobacco from China into 
Poland and making cigarettes…. They’re garbage you know, and the crew asked me to 
fucking sell them I said no I’m out of it now, not doing fuck all for us. I said I’m not 
gonna sell that shit you know people don’t want them, they’re rubbish” (interview with 
criminal entrepreneur #2). 
 
Intra-EU manufacturing involves brand logos being added at the point of sale in an attempt not 
only to reduce costs associated with production abroad but also to reduce or eliminate risks in 
the transportation phase by avoiding inspections by the customs at the external borders of the 
EU. The majority of this type of packaging material associated with (counterfeit) tobacco 
products, for instance, was stopped at the UK, the Netherlands or French borders and was 
recorded as having originated predominantly from China (EUROPOL/EUIPO, 2017).  
The UK has been one of the major destination countries for counterfeit products, 
something that is naturally affected by increased demand for branded products (Electrical 
Safety First, n.d; Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016; Large, 2019). As Electrical Safety First (n.d) 
highlight, this extends to branded products which typically have higher safety risks, such as 
electrical products. From 2009 to 2012, for example, the UK experienced a six-fold increase in 
the number of counterfeit electrical goods seized by the authorities, a phenomenon fuelled by 
demand for “branded” designer headphones and gadgets such as hair straighteners (The 
Guardian, 2013). Anecdotal data gathered from enforcement officials suggests socio-
economically deprived areas are usually hotspots for the sale of such counterfeit goods (see 
also Wiltshire et al., 2001).  
 
Structure and scale of operations 
Within the context of the counterfeiting business, some actors may be working in/for 




manipulated by so called ‘organised criminals’ as official accounts suggest (EUROPOL, 2013). 
Our research found individuals involved in counterfeiting business are often self-employed 
entrepreneurs. What may be viewed by some as criminal collaboration between a ‘producer’ 
and a seller, or a wholesaler and a retailer, does not necessarily involve an employer-employee 
relationship but a business-to-business relationship. Indeed, an environment of great 
importance for the formation and consolidation of relationships for the counterfeit products 
trade is legal businesses. Legal businesses also operate as the context in which relationships 
(employer-employee and between/among partners) are forged and transformed into criminal 
business relationships, and dependability of individuals is manifested (see van de Bunt and 
Kleemans, 2007). 
Our research exposed a range of different schemes trading in counterfeit products that 
can be categorised based on scale:  
Small-scale schemes: involving people of Eastern Europeans, Indian and Chinese 
heritage who live in the UK going to their countries for a short period of time and returning to 
the UK with the merchandise or British holidaymakers who visit counterfeit manufacturing 
hotspots abroad returning with various types of fakes. The type and brand of the merchandise 
bought in these countries to be traded in the UK is not only a case of the potential for profit but 
also considerations about access to potential customers that would be willing to buy the 
merchandise. One of our interviewees, ‘Dave’, is a 36-year old university graduate working as 
a full-time bartender, part-time English teacher from a city in the North West of England. He 
has been married to ‘Yuki’ for about 4 years (interview conducted in April 2017). They met 
when ‘Dave’ visited China for the first time with a friend in 2012 to teach English at a summer 
school for Chinese students planning to study at UK universities. Every summer he teaches for 
six weeks in Shanghai, and ‘Dave’ and ‘Yuki’ stay with ‘Yuki’s’ parents and brother in the 
city. In Shanghai, ‘Dave’ buys fake TAG Heuer watches for as little as £30 each to sell to UK-
based customers. His decision to trade in counterfeit TAG Heuer instead of counterfeit Rolex 
watches is not based on being unable to access the latter brand but the fact that his potential 
clientele would be suspicious of the low price for Rolex – a commodity that they would find 
difficult to ‘back up’ anyway – and thus reluctant to buy: 
 
“The watches are in relatively good condition and they look like the real deal. It’s not 
like we are selling Rolexes for £300 making people suspicious. TAG Heuer are good 
but not that good, and ‘Joe Bloggs’ can wear them in the pub or at work. The Rolex… 
you have to back it up” (interview with criminal entrepreneur #4).  
 
Large-scale schemes: involve the importation of significant quantities (containers, 
truckloads) of various types of merchandise from China, Eastern Europe (Poland, Ukraine, 
Russia, Lithuania etc.) and Arab states. The structure is largely fragmented when it comes to 
large-scale counterfeiting schemes, i.e. a chain of local transactions, although the structure also 
depends on the type of merchandise produced or smuggled, and the scale of the business. A 
counterfeit tobacco business is generally based on loose networks of entrepreneurs. More 
sophisticated products such as electronics and pharmaceuticals involve groups that are more 
centralised, groups with a major actor in them, who is usually very well-connected to people 
in other countries (Customs intelligence officer #1). The fragmentation of a network that is 
involved in a large-scale counterfeiting scheme is exemplified by the fact that often other 
members of the counterfeiting network – even those taking part in a crucial part of the process 
such as transportation - know very little or even nothing about the overall scheme (Interview 
with criminal entrepreneur #2) (see also Savona and Riccardi, 2015).  
 In the counterfeit business (just as in other illicit markets, see Morselli and Roy, 2008), 




of the network - and the service they offer, is significant. Some of these brokers facilitate the 
entrance of individuals in a counterfeiting business or in a different level of the business. Other 
brokers introduce importers (even those involved in small-scale importation schemes) to the 
right sources of merchandise, which often ensures a certain level of quality (Interview with 
criminal entrepreneur #4). Brokerage can also be offered by people who are actively involved 
in the trade. One such example in the data is criminal entrepreneur #5, ‘John’, a 58-year-old 
transportation company owner. John oversees every detail in his business and applies the same 
principles in both his legal and illegal commercial activities. Furthermore, in many cases, 
brokers facilitate the international transportation of counterfeit products, storage, and the provision 
of the relevant documentation to local authorities (EUROPOL/Officer for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market, 2016). 
 
Economic, technological and extra-legal dimensions 
An important aspect of the counterfeiting business which is ignored by official, media, and 
business analyses is the fact that counterfeiting is embedded in legal production and trade 
practices in a globalised economy. There are numerous convergence points between legal and 
illegal supply chains. Occasionally, there is also a symbiotic relationship between the legal and 
counterfeit products supply chains. There is, for instance, evidence that counterfeiters have 
been selling designer knock-offs manufactured by the same craftspeople who produce the 
originals (UNODC, 2010). The UK system enables open competition, and as such counterfeiters 
are allowed to enter the supply chain more easily because there is less supervision on the part of 
the authorities (EUROPOL/Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, 2016). A counterfeit 
product manufacturer in the vast majority of cases obtains raw materials from a legitimate 
material supplier. Counterfeiters often import unbranded commodities - which is not an illegal 
practice - and apply trademark labels and tags before the commodities are introduced into the 
retail market. Counterfeiting schemes take advantage of the normal commercial channels (e.g. 
postage services, transportation companies or maritime shipping companies, and delivery 
companies) (Shen et al., 2010). 
Counterfeiting schemes also take advantage of special economic zones (SEZs). These 
include free ports, free trade zones and export processing zones that are regularly used to transit 
counterfeit products. As deregulated conduits, free zones offer business-friendly economic 
environmental factors such as the free flow of capital, lower taxes on imports and exports, and 
less risk in terms of policing (Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016. Counterfeiting entrepreneurs tend 
to ship their products via complex routes, with many transit points SEZ to facilitate the 
falsification of documents in order to hide the original point of departure of the counterfeit 
merchandise, to repackage and/or re-label the merchandise, and avoid interception of their 
merchandise by the authorities (OECD/EUIPO, 2017). 
Once imported in the UK, counterfeiters often use self-storage units to store counterfeit 
goods before they introduce them in the retail market, and these storage units are not properly (if 
at all) monitored by the legal companies operating them (see EUROPOL/Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market, 2016). In many instances legal business are the sales or 
use context for the counterfeit products, and integrally linked to a purely legal service process. 
Merchandise is very often sold in legal businesses that are related to the legal trade in the 
commodity (e.g. counterfeit alcohol being sold in a legal company importing alcohol and pubs).  
  Another important aspect of the counterfeiting business is the increasingly significant 
role played by information and communication technologies (ICTs), which also touches upon 
the role of the legal in the counterfeiting business since internet service providers, registrars, 
payment processors and payment gateways are integral nodes of the infrastructure needed to trade 
in counterfeit products online. The increase in counterfeit goods being traded has been 




commerce since the late twentieth century, with the Internet now acting as an important avenue 
through which this criminal market is expanding (see Wall and Large, 2010; Treadwell, 2011; 
Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016; Large, 2019; Shen, 2018). First, ICTs have facilitated the trade 
and contributed to the trade’s mutation to a significant extent. For example, apart from allowing 
the electronic transfer of money, it has transformed the retail activity of traders, coupled with 
a remarkable increase in the number of small parcels coming into the UK and corresponding 
deliveries in recent years (Interview with HMRC -HM Revenue & Customs- officer). Second, 
ICTs have expanded opportunities to engage in the business to a wide and diverse set of actors 
who are not necessarily involved in other forms of crime, and to experienced criminal actors 
looking to move into a low risk market (Interview with Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit 
officer; Interview with investigator for a private company). Finally, ICTs have also provided 
entrepreneurs with access to a significant number of potential customers. Social media sites, 
particularly Facebook, act as online sites for supply of counterfeit products. Some actors use a 
variety of social networking sites to advertise their products (Hall and Antonopoulos, 2015; 
Intellectual Property Office, 2017). 
 
 
THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF COUNTERFEITING  
 
Capital to start and sustain a counterfeiting scheme 
Start-up capital is required for someone to enter the counterfeiting business, cover the costs of 
establishing the business and operate it until some profit is generated. This initial amount 
depends largely on the product-type and the quantity and quality of the merchandise being 
traded. There is a wide range of sources that can be drawn upon for the initiation of 
counterfeiting operations. The first, concerning small-scale schemes, can be small funds from 
legitimate work and savings. This category includes start-up money from social security 
benefits. This becomes possible because of the extremely low funds that are required for one 
to enter a counterfeiting scheme selling on a small scale to friends and acquaintances. 
Ironically, such schemes funded by social security are essentially state-subsidised. Small-scale 
start-up capital can also include funds from legitimate work and savings, which allows virtually 
anyone with a small amount of capital to become involved in the business, from holidaymakers 
to students and those working internationally. The case of ‘Dave’, one of our interviewees and 
a counterfeit TAG Heuer watch entrepreneur, is indicative here. The money invested in his 
scheme is personal money; savings from his legal work as a bartender from September to June. 
The amount invested in buying the counterfeit watches is about £900 per year (Interview with 
criminal entrepreneur #4). In another case we came across a young man living with his parents 
operated a Facebook-based business delivering merchandise locally. He started the business by 
buying £200 worth of counterfeit merchandise from Bristol Fruit Market (a ‘Sunday market’ 
in South West England). The authorities estimated that he made a profit of £20,000 within six 
months (interview with investigator working in a private company). 
Schemes are also funded with money from legal business. In this case, the actors are 
often owners of transportation/logistics companies or legitimate companies trading in the same 
commodity that is counterfeited (e.g. alcohol wholesalers trading in counterfeit alcohol). In 
cases where a scheme becomes successful, it can attract investment from others involved in the 
trade. Sometimes the criminal entrepreneurs are presented with opportunities to expand and 
invite people from their wider social and (legal) business circles to join the scheme. In this 
way, financing ‘consortia’ are established with the goal of importing larger loads of better 
quality merchandise.  
A number of counterfeiting schemes are initiated by money invested by criminal 




activities. For example, in one case we came across a cannabis trafficker from a city in North 
West England who invested money from the cannabis business into the counterfeit tobacco 
business because the risks were extremely low, and because he suspected that the police had 
become aware of his drugs business. It is also not unusual for criminals to invest small amounts 
of money into someone else’s counterfeiting scheme. This practice tends to be found in small 
localities in which everyone is familiar with one another and information about successful and 
profitable illegal schemes flows across social networks. We have found that this is especially 
the case with counterfeit tobacco (see also Antonopoulos and Hall, 2015) and alcohol schemes. 
Occasionally, these local criminals extort their way into a counterfeiting scheme in something 
that could be described as a ‘forced investment’:  
 
“I can mention one interesting case with proper criminals dealing in drugs getting 
involved in extortion etc. who forced their way into counterfeiting business. Poor guys 
selling cheap perfumes all of a sudden paid a visit by a crime group asking them in” 
(Interview with customs intelligence officer #1). 
 
Some schemes are initiated by counterfeiting entrepreneurs with loans. In one of the interviews, 
the participant was aware of an entrepreneur who had asked for a small loan of £1,500 as start-
up capital from his son. In most cases, loans are provided by legitimate businesspeople. We 
know that loans come with differential interest rates in counterfeiting cases; however, we do 
not possess any information about the actual rates. Obtaining a loan for a counterfeiting scheme 
depends, firstly, on knowing the debtor personally and/or from previous business ventures. The 
latter is a common occurrence, especially among the transportation company owners who tend 
to collaborate on international projects, mostly in Eastern and Southern Europe. Legal business 
owners are more likely to be able to secure a loan and guarantee repayments because: 
▪ their owners tend to be known by the lenders via previous projects or simply as 
colleagues; 
▪ legal businesses have tangible assets (e.g. trucks, cranes, premises, furniture, etc.) that 
could possibly be liquidated, if there is a difficulty in the loan being repaid. Legal 
businesses also have a number of intangible but extremely important assets such as a 
name and reputation in the business, which in a way guarantees some insurance for the 
lender; 
▪ legal business owners generally want to avoid the shame of not being able to repay a 
loan and the repercussions (financial or otherwise) this has for the borrower in the legal 
(and illegal) business world (Interview with forensic accountant) (see also Åkerström, 
1985).    
Data from Chinese sources seems to suggest an additional ‘start-up’ scheme. It involves 
overseas (legitimate and illegitimate) businesses which have unauthorised goods made by 
Chinese (legitimate and illegitimate) manufacturers on an Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) basis. OEM refers to a company that makes parts and products for other companies 
which sell them under their own name or use them in their own manufacturing. Qian (2008) 
observed that a large number of private sector labour-intensive enterprises in China have been 
OEMs for established brand-name products in Japan and developed economies in Europe and 
North America. Due in part to a lack of IPR awareness among private sector manufacturers, 
especially village and township enterprises, IPR clauses were rarely incorporated in the OEM 
contracts, and neither had the issue of brand ownership ever been considered. Overseas 
counterfeiting entrepreneurs who are not genuine brand owners have advantage of this 
negligence (Li, 2007; Wang, 2014). Under this scheme, financers might be legal entrepreneurs 




overseas entrepreneurs. However, at this stage in the project we have no firm details about 
exactly how OEMs are financed.  
The counterfeiting entrepreneurs and the investors/financiers are linked in the first 
instance via the local community and common acquaintances, and are often legal business 
partners. An investor’s share is ensured by trust. This trust is forged primarily in legal business 
and in previous legal and illegal projects (see von Lampe and Johansen, 2004). However, in 
the case of ‘forced investment’ by an investor or a ‘consortium’ of investors, the major way in 
which a share is entrusted is fear of extortion or threat of violence (see Winlow, 2001) from 
local criminals forcing their way into the scheme. 
 
Settlement of payments in the counterfeiting business 
Usually, small-scale criminal entrepreneurs involved in the counterfeiting business, such as 
‘Dave’, tend to procure merchandise from legal retailers in other countries. Irrespective of the 
supplier, there are no special arrangements with regards to payment. Cash is almost always 
given up-front, which is also the arrangement in the transactions between sellers and buyers at 
the retail level; the basic principle here is “no money, no merchandise”. Occasionally, if the 
customer is a regular with a good record of payments, merchandise is given on credit. In one 
case discussed by an interviewee, counterfeit fashion items were given to a regular customer 
who wanted to wear them on an upcoming holiday but did not want to spend his holiday money 
(interview with criminal entrepreneur #5).  
At the wholesale/importation level, however, credit is more common, especially in 
cases where the individuals involved have pre-existing working relationships and levels of 
trust. Alternatively, the provision of credit is facilitated by a broker, who may be able to vouch 
for the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur receiving the merchandise on credit. Other criteria 
of credit provision in the wholesale/importation level include evidence of how ‘healthy’ the 
legal business of an entrepreneur is, the presence of collaterals/assets in the criminal 
entrepreneur’s legal business, and evidence that payments (in previous legal and illegal 
projects) are delivered on time (interview with forensic accountant). According to Gambetta 
(2007: 87), “the best way to establish one’s reputation for trustworthiness is simple: behave 
well and live up to one’s promises”. When a legal business acts as the platform for the 
counterfeiting business, it becomes a context in which ‘good behaviour’ and meeting certain 
financial promises become crucial norms to be manifested and displayed whenever possible. 
These accounts are largely supported by our observations in China, but the extension of credit 
appears to be rare in the international trade in counterfeit goods with Chinese suppliers. 
Payment for a transaction usually starts with a nominal deposit, and the outstanding balance 
must be paid before the goods leave the port. In this process, agents or local international 
trading companies act as de facto guarantors to ensure that the goods do not leave the country 
without being paid for.  
When the internet is used as a medium for the transactions involving counterfeit 
products, the payments are made either by PayPal or by credit card (interview with member of 
EU Intellectual Property Office). It is worth noting however, that the trend amongst large 
Facebook sellers based in the UK is that they increasingly prefer to be paid through bank 
transfers. The reasons are that when customers realise the products they bought online are fake 
or defective, they cannot claim their money back, as is the case with platforms such as PayPal 
(interview with investigator in private company). Legal businesses are used as front companies 
and existing payment facilities are used for the sale of counterfeit products. In terms of 
payments, e-commerce has simplified the process of buying and selling counterfeit goods, but 
also borrowing/renting the bank accounts of friends and family members (Hall and 
Antonopoulos, 2016). Our observations in China suggest that e-payment via smartphones has 




(Alipay) and wei-xing-zhi-fu (WeChat Pay) seem to be the most frequently used payment 
methods in transactions between Chinese suppliers and overseas buyers for both small and 
large schemes. Similarly, in the UK, as one interviewed academic noted “most of the lads I 
know involved in selling fakes do it all using Whats App, Facebook and Paypal on their 
phones” (Interviewed academic #2). 
A variety of settlements that do not involve money are also present in a few UK cases. 
For example, when a batch or a truckload of the merchandise is seized by the authorities, 
usually at the borders, brokers and/or importers require some proof. In this case, those who are 
responsible for the merchandise when it was seized look for relevant weblinks or for local 
and/or national newspapers clippings that are scanned and sent electronically to the person who 
was supposed to receive the merchandise. Similarly, when a package of counterfeit UGG boots 
was intercepted by the HMRC, the person who was supposed to receive them was sent a letter 
from the HMRC stating that they have been seized. However, the customers scanned and sent 
this official letter to the producers and got another pair of boots free (Interview with EUROPOL 
official). According to an EUIPO (EU Intellectual Property Office) member:    
 
“Some of these guys [counterfeiters] still have a policy of ‘If you’re not happy, you 
send it back and I’ll reimburse the money.’ Some of these guys really have a customer 
service. They do things very, very well” (interview with member of EU Intellectual 
Property Office). 
 
In wholesale/importation schemes a number of people can act as payment facilitators. These 
are usually people who operate as the brokers who brought together two or more disconnected 
parts of the scheme in the first place. For example, in importations made in N. Ireland, people 
of Irish origin who live and work in China facilitate the payment process between the 
wholesalers and manufacturers of counterfeit cigarettes in China or the Chinese wholesalers. 
These Irish brokers have stayed in the country for many years, they speak the language, and 
they have previously conducted business with the Chinese. Financially speaking it is a simple 
process; the brokers operating in China are paid for their knowledge and local guanxi (social 
networks). They are paid towards the upper level (wholesale level) of the business, thousands 
of pounds per importation, or in the case of large deals, about 1% of the profit made by the UK 
importer. Unfortunately, because of the fragmented nature of the business and brokers’ 
tendency to operate on the international level, more detailed information is not currently 
available. What can be said, however, is that in critical moments (e.g. when a batch is late, 
seized, lost etc.), the broker, who was responsible for bringing together two other parties to 
conduct business, is the first point of contact for both parties, and makes sure that frictions of 
any kind are smoothed over and misunderstandings cleared. As ‘John’ – an importer who also 
acted as a broker for other entrepreneurs – emphatically put it during the interview: “every time 
a load was lost, seized, late, they busted my balls…’Where is it? Where is he? Where are you? 
Who is going to pay?’...” (interview with criminal entrepreneur #5). 
 Payments between entrepreneurs can be settled outside the strict context of the illegal 
business, and spill over into the legal side of the business. This tends to be the case with 
business people who simultaneously do legal and illegal business. Sometimes, when a financial 
or other settlement cannot be made, or where there are delays in the supply of the merchandise, 
or bad batches, etc., ‘information’ becomes as currency in exchanges. This can be information 
about the legal and illegal dealings of a competitor, another legal or illegal business 
opportunity, or the possibility of the debtor acting as a broker between the disconnected parties: 
 
“So we had the agreement that on such and such day I will have 350 Louis Vuitton 




push forward’. Guess what, the handbags were not delivered in time, my clients were 
not happy, I was not happy… The Polish [who the entrepreneur was to buy the stuff 
from] said ‘sorry boss, here’s your money, how can we make it up to you and stuff’. 
That’s not good enough, do you know what I mean… they said ‘OK, do you want to 
make some money? We will introduce you to our friend who wants to move handmade 
furniture from Krakow to London. Are we OK?’ Not bad, was it?...” (interview with 
criminal entrepreneur #6). 
 
Spending and investing profits from counterfeiting 
How counterfeiting money is spent and/or invested naturally depends on the profits but also 
the social environment of the entrepreneurs and the opportunities it offers, as well as the 
entrepreneur’s values and priorities (Zelizer, 1989). For many the spending is survivalist in the 
sense that the proceeds of (primarily small-scale) entrepreneurship are used to buy essential 
commodities and services. The entrepreneurs who engage in this type of spending are far away 
from the ‘organised criminal’ stereotype. Many engage in the counterfeiting business to 
supplement benefits and/or low wages.   
Profits from the counterfeiting business are often spent on lifestyle consumption, 
including luxuries (such as jewellery, antiques, cocaine, expensive cars with high running 
costs) that allow the conspicuous display of the counterfeiters’ success and personal wealth 
(see Hall et al., 2008): “quite funnily, they [counterfeiters] stick to the areas they come from, 
disadvantaged areas, and drive expensive cars… and they wonder why people snitch” 
(Interview with HMRC investigative officer). Ironically, the first thing ‘Dave’ bought with the 
money from his first importation of fake watches was a real TAG Heuer Carrera from a major 
jeweller’s chain in the UK: “I could not live with myself knowing that I wear a fake watch”. 
Other purchases include expensive furniture: “We can now say, ‘let’s go and buy this 
handmade coffee table or a dining table with 10 chairs, not six! We even got a king size bed 
without looking at the price” (Interview with criminal entrepreneur #4). Money is also spent 
on expensive holidays abroad: “Some people [counterfeiters] on Facebook it’s like they’re 
celebrities. Oh God, you’re in the Maldives again?” (Interview with investigator in private 
company) (see also Junninen, 2006). In one case, which involved the importation of six metric 
tonnes of raw tobacco in hundreds of parcels from Belgium and the Netherlands to the UK, a 
criminal entrepreneur spent £1.1 million at betting shops in a single year (The Gazette, 2016). 
Unlike those entrepreneurs, who prefer to spend their profits on hedonistic pursuits (see 
Hall et al., 2008), some entrepreneurs, who are family-oriented, pay off their own and their 
(extended) family members’ debts and mortgages. Others in this category buy or renovate 
houses and other properties in the UK and abroad (Ireland, Spain or the entrepreneur’s country 
of origin for minority ethnic entrepreneurs) and/or pay for their children’s education. Family-
oriented spending is usually modest, and in these cases entrepreneurs are careful to make sure 
that it does not extend too far beyond their legal income, thus avoiding too much attention (see 
also van Duyne and Levi, 2005; Skinnari, 2010). 
Apart from spending, the more successful criminal entrepreneurs invest profits from 
counterfeiting to (legal) businesses linked to own contacts and networks and areas of previous 
experience and knowledge (see also L’Hoiry, 2013). For example, we came across an 
entrepreneur with an existing job in the food supply chain who sought to expand his business 
using profits from his counterfeit tobacco business. Actors are typically restricted to investing 
in areas in which they have some prior experience and expertise. 
However, the counterfeiting business itself is also a common target for reinvestment. 
From the initial moment a scheme becomes successful, part of the profit is invested in 
subsequent schemes and occasionally – especially in the case of owners of legal businesses – 




sole entrepreneurs or do not own a legal business that acts as a platform for their counterfeiting 
business, carefully consider the ‘profit-risk’ ratio of their business (see Dean et al., 2010). They 
deliberately re-invest relatively small amounts of money (£1000) and do not wish to expand 
but simply maintain a low volume-high value scheme because of the logistical complexities 
and risks involved in expansion or diversification; mostly financial risks that they do not have 
the capacity to absorb should something go wrong:  
 
“Imagine if I brought over 100 watches… I would need a suitcase at least, and what 
would happen, if they are seized at the border? Exactly… my money is gone…” 
(Interview with criminal entrepreneur #4). 
 
Similarly, those entrepreneurs with an online component to their business re-invest small 
amounts from their initial profits in order to maintain a low profile on specific online platforms:  
 
“You just start off with one batch and then you build it up and build it up, but the 
problem you’ve got then is if you’re on eBay, eBay will make you become a trader so 
you will have to put information about yourself on there so you’d have to hide there, so 
there are obstacles that you’ve got to overcome and you’ve just got to hope that… we’re 
not watching. So that’s another way of doing it, it’s the investment is quite small” 
(Interview with National Trading Standards officer #3). 
 
Investors involve criminal business-oriented investors. Although the usual route is for 
criminals to invest profits from other criminal business into counterfeiting because of the 
relatively lower risks involved, in one interesting case provided by the HMRC investigative 
officer we interviewed a couple invested their profits from counterfeiting and other business 
activities in the construction of a hotel in Pakistan. This was used as a recruitment and transit 
point for individuals, who were to be trafficked into the UK for labour exploitation. 
 
"We had information about a British Pakistani couple in Bradford. They were owners 
of a relatively big clothes company in Bradford and our intelligence suggested they 
were involved in counterfeiting. Clothes, bags, belts, you name it. We raided the 
premises in this area full of warehouses, and we started searching for money, products, 
documents. People were also working illegally in the business. One of my colleagues 
noticed a poster of a big building on the wall. Looked like a big house abroad but the 
thing is that this house was in bigger and smaller frames in their house too... In the 
living room, in the office, in the kitchen. Our investigation revealed that this building 
was in fact a hotel that was built with money from the counterfeiting business and it 
was used as a recruiting and harbouring venue for trafficked persons from Asia, mostly 
Pakistan. After the came to the UK, they would work in the clothes company, in 
restaurants..." (Interview with HMRC investigative officer). 
 
 
Money laundering  
It appears that in many UK-based cases money laundering is unnecessary because criminal 
entrepreneurs make relatively small profits, perhaps enough to guarantee the entrepreneur and 
his/her family in the UK or abroad a middle-class quality of life (see Skinnari, 2010)2. There 
are, however, large-scale projects in which criminal entrepreneurs need to launder significant 
 
2 Although, strictly speaking, such spending may still constitute money laundering pursuant to the UK’s anti-





profits to remove the specific qualities of the origin of the money and render it indistinguishable 
from all other money. In a survey conducted by the UK IP Crime Group, 49 per cent of 
respondents to the UK’s trading standards survey indicated that they had worked on cases 
which involved both counterfeiting and money laundering (UK IP Crime Group cited in 
UNODC, no date). In one of these cases, in 2016, a couple from the town of Ballymena in N. 
Ireland were sentenced for counterfeiting and money laundering offences. The couple traded 
in counterfeit BMW car accessories and making more than £40,000 a month. The Prosecutors 
requested a confiscation of the couple’s assets, which had an estimated value of over £1 million 
(Intellectual Property Office, 2016).  
Again, entrepreneurs who own a legal business have an advantage over those who do 
not, because they can integrate their counterfeiting proceeds with financial streams in the legal 
business. For example, as Lord et al. (2017) note, the proceeds of alcohol counterfeiting are 
hidden as an otherwise legitimate business transaction (e.g. purchase of water), and some 
profits are laundered via wages to employees. Our research has also identified a diverse set of 
money-laundering techniques involving investment in payday loan companies. The investment 
entry level is £100,000 and there is a typical return of approximately 30-40% (Interview with 
HMRC investigative officer). We have also come across investments of counterfeit proceeds 
in pawnshops or shops that deal in high value items. One of the criminal entrepreneurs 
interviewed launders money from counterfeiting in illicit puppy farms. He buys Rottweiler and 
Irish Wolfhound puppies for a relatively low price (£700-800) and sells them in their real/legal 
market value (£1200-1700) (Interview with criminal entrepreneur #5). In other cases 
counterfeiting entrepreneurs launder money through cash-intensive businesses. For example, 
in a case we came across, the City of London Police identified Turkish counterfeiters who 
traded in trainers and sportswear, and laundered their proceeds through a café, which was also 
used to physically hide cash in safety deposit boxes.  
Profits from the counterfeiting business are also sent via money transfer services from 
the UK to other countries, mostly in the Middle East, in which a less diligent approach or a 
lack of knowledge of foreign systems presents barriers to the tracking of criminal proceeds 
transferred abroad:   
 
“Historically with money service bureaus it really is a challenge to keep a track 
because there is so much money flowing, you know, around the world and it can be very 
difficult to attribute it, you know. …We mentioned the Chaudhrys… this crime family 
in Manchester. All of their money went to Dubai, where it went from there I am not too 
sure. I was out there speaking to a representative of the CPS3 and she described the 
Dubai Authorities as having a light touch fiscal approach. When I said ‘what does that 
mean’ she said ‘well, they don’t actually give a shit’” (Interview with UK Intellectual 
Property Office official). 
 
The amounts per transfer seem to average around £2,000 in order to avoid reporting thresholds, 
although significantly higher amounts are transferred in those cases where counterfeiting 
entrepreneurs know they are under investigation by the authorities (Interview with HMRC 
investigative officer) (see also EUROPOL Financial Intelligence Group, 2015). Similarly, 
Hawala or hundi, informal money transfer systems (also known as ‘underground banking’) 
(Passas, 2005), have been identified as a means of sending the proceeds of counterfeiting 
abroad. This method is popular in English cities such as Bradford, Manchester, Birmingham 
and localities of London, and among British Asian entrepreneurs involved in the counterfeiting 
business.  
 




The legitimate banking system is also used for low-intensity laundering. An 
entrepreneur placed small chunks of his counterfeiting profits in a number of Individual 
Savings Accounts (ISAs). He also transferred profits from one bank account to the other in 
order to receive the tax-free interest for the amount deposited (interview with private 
investigator). However, examples of investment in offshore bank accounts are rather atypical 
cases because most entrepreneurs do not know people who could assist with the practicalities 
of setting up such accounts (see L’Hoiry, 2013).  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The counterfeiting business is yet another example of an illegal enterprise no longer 
“segregated, morally or physically, from the mainstream of economic society” (Naylor, 1996: 
80). Our research found that the trade is a fragmented business, which does not necessarily 
require a great degree of sophistication and management of finance and resources. Individual 
entrepreneurs and/or participants in counterfeiting networks are very often opportunists, who 
identify a small or big opportunity to secure a part of the market. Counterfeiting entrepreneurs 
possess skills and resources that are useful and functional for trade through their legal business 
and/or employment, and “for people with a legal commercial business, illegal activities can 
sometimes become completely interwoven with their daily pattern of activities” (Kleemans and 
de Poot, 2008: 84). Others depend on personal and social ties that act as bridges to opportunities 
for profits; or what Kleemans and de Poot (2008) call ‘social opportunity structures’. In 
addition, these social relations “solve problems of cooperating in an environment that is 
dominated by distrust, suspicion and potential deceit” (van de Bunt and Kleemans, 2007: 173). 
ICTs facilitate communication between and among entrepreneurs who trade in counterfeit 
goods. The Internet now acts as an important avenue through which the counterfeiting market 
is expanding. There has been a significant increase in counterfeit goods being traded online. 
The internet is used as a medium for the transactions involving counterfeit products, with e-
commerce markets simplifying the process of buying and selling. With regards to the online 
aspect of the counterfeiting business, however, it is important to remember that in reality the online 
element in the trade is largely based upon a set of established criminal acts: intellectual property 
crime and fraud. McQuade (2011) would define these criminal activities as adaptive in the sense 
that they constitute technological variations of ‘traditional’ crimes.  
Financially speaking, the market in counterfeit products is an attractive market for a 
number of reasons. It is a potentially large market that covers virtually any legally produced 
commodity. It is a ‘perfectly competitive market’ (Makowski and Ostroy, 2001) in the sense 
that anyone can get involved if they have a small amount to invest and - unlike perhaps the 
markets in drugs, arms etc. – there is an extremely low entry threshold. The market is indeed 
open to anyone even if they (initially at least) intend to deal in small quantities.  
As importers and wholesalers are primarily situated in the domain of legal business, 
apart from limiting risks, they have developed relevant expertise and social capital, and they 
have a range of options towards financing a scheme. For instance, a legal business is the 
platform for the easier provision of a loan by other legal entrepreneurs. Simultaneously, these 
legal businesses are also the terrain upon which payments are often settled and upon which the 
provision of credit is facilitated by trust among actors involved and by brokers who are able to 
vouch for the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur receiving the merchandise. In a sense, in the 
counterfeiting business what one can observe is the infiltration of the illegal business by the 
legal business, rather than the other way around. Most of the entrepreneurs we interviewed, 
although they manifested entrepreneurial acumen to a varying extent, did not manage profits 
in an efficient enough way so as to be considered a ‘threat’ to social order or the financial 




entrepreneurial acumen of the counterfeiter, the (immediate) surrounding economy (see 
Kruisbergen et al., 2015), and the entrepreneurs values and expectations (see van Duyne, 2007). 
The entrepreneurs either possessed a small piece of the market with modest profits that simply 
spilled over into the legal economy, or they did not have the capacity to launder bigger profits 
(perhaps as a direct effect of anti-money laundering policy and practice) (Levi, 2013). It is 
perhaps the entrepreneurs’ low value of assets couple with their spending (many times chaotic 
spending) patterns that often results in “assessed levels of criminal benefits [being] unlikely to 
be recoverable” and attrition in confiscating the proceeds of crime (Bullock et al., 2009b: 14).  
When money laundering is the case, criminal entrepreneurs are embedded in legitimate 
businesses which provide for a very convenient extant setting for this type of financial 
management (see Kleemans and van de Bunt, 2008). In these cases, it is plausible to suggest 
that legal businesses receiving injections of cash (and indeed business opportunities) deriving 
from the trade in counterfeit products may have an advantage over their legal competitors that 
are not involved in counterfeiting or other illicit schemes (see Spapens, 2017).  
The generally unsophisticated financial management practices in the counterfeit 
products trade are the result of a number of factors, such as its fragmented, decentralised and 
‘perfectly competitive’ nature, which in the UK creates an environment where crime-money is 
widely distributed rather than gathered in the hands of few big players. This supports the results 
of research based on official data on asset-confiscation, which shows that although a large 
amount of organised crime-money exists, and irrespective of the type of asset this money is 
converted into, its distribution is unequal (see van Duyne et al., 2014). The same seems to 
apply to many of the counterfeiting entrepreneurs in the UK (see Bullock et al. 2009b). 
Overall, our research begins to draw attention to the global counterfeit goods market as 
one type of illicit financial flow. To date, there has been too much criminological focus on 
money laundering and, in socio-legal studies, too much focus on the economic losses of 
corporate intellectual property (IP) owners. More work is needed on the connection of money 
to various markets, the mechanisms involved in the connections between micro-finance, wealth 
management and private banks, and work that takes account of financial innovation, of which 
there was little knowledge pre-crisis and where legal and regulatory loopholes remain. In 
addition, more in-depth research work is needed to identify patterns of financial management 
in various counterfeit goods markets. All of this requires further collaborative research and 
innovative research techniques. The ambition is that our research, by drawing attention to a 
hugely neglected research area, will be used as an important building block for further research 
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